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PART I 
Several commentators have suggested that standards governing 
admission of scientific evidence should be different in criminal and 
civil cases and that the prosecution in criminal cases should be held 
to a higher standard than the defense because the prosecution has a 
higher burden of proof.1  I prefer to see reasonable doubt as a 
sufficiency standard that has no impact at the admissibility stage.2  
The reasonable doubt standard should be applied by the trier at the 
end of the trial, when all the evidence is in. 
 
The reasonable doubt standard reflects dual goals: first to acquit 
if the doubt is reasonable; second to convict if the doubt is fanciful.  
Both goals are dealt with in the typical instruction stating that a 
reasonable doubt is not any possible doubt or a doubt based on 
speculation, but that it has to be the type of doubt that would cause a 
juror to hesitate in making an important decision in the juror’s own 
 
 ∗ James Edgar Hervey Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings 
College of Law.  This comment is a response to the version of Professor Friedman’s 
paper given to participants at the Seton Hall Law School Evidence Symposium held 
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 1 See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1047 (2003), D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional 
Taxonomy for the Post-Kumho World, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 508 (2000), Paul Giannelli, 
The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1071 (2003) (in 
passing).  Much of Professor Friedman’s paper deals with applying the sufficiency 
standard in entering judgments of acquittal when the prosecution case rests on 
dubious scientific evidence, but he also advocates a higher standard for the 
prosecution at the admission stage.  See Friedman, supra, at 1069 (“In some cases, the 
courts should simply admit the evidence, notwithstanding doubts about its reliability 
. . . .  This is especially so with respect to defense evidence.”); see also id. at 1060-61. 
 2 Compare Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987), where the Supreme 
Court stated, in discussing the standard of proof applicable to factual findings about 
the foundation for co-conspirators’ statements, that “the evidentiary standard is 
unrelated to the burden of proof on the substantive issues, be it a criminal case . . . 
or a civil case. . . .”  Professor Risinger predicted that many of us would see it that 
way.  See Risinger, supra note 1, at n.53. 
 1114 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:1113 
life. 3 
When cases are close to the line drawn by the burden of proof, 
as is true of many if not most cases that go to trial, then there is no 
reason to think that evidence that is given exaggerated importance 
will lead to the wrong result more often when it is offered by the 
prosecution than when offered by the defense.  In cases in which 
dubious expert testimony is available to one side or the other, is the 
prosecution systematically short of the proof line (so that the dubious 
testimony might illicitly push the case over the line) or systematically 
beyond the proof line (so that the dubious testimony might illicitly 
push the case back)?  This is an empirical question for which 
abstractions about reasonable doubt offer no help. 
Thinking that dubious evidence does less harm when it helps the 
defense than when it helps the prosecution is enticing because 
acquitting a guilty person is better than convicting an innocent one.  
But that is not the correct way to frame the issue.  When the case is 
near the proof line, an error on the side of the defense would mean 
acquitting someone who had just barely been proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and an error on the side of the prosecution would 
mean convicting someone who has almost but not quite been proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Both errors are equally bad.   
To illustrate, suppose that the standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is satisfied when twenty guilty people are acquitted 
for every one innocent person convicted.  (If readers do not like the 
20-1 ratio, they are invited to substitute their own; the principle is the 
same.)  If so, letting twenty-one guilty people go free for every 
innocent person convicted is just as bad an error as letting only 
nineteen guilty go free for every innocent convicted.  To say that the 
first error is less serious is to argue for an elevation of the standard, so 
that twenty-one guilty are set free for every innocent convicted.  
Reiteration of this reasoning process would lead to imposing an 
infinite burden of proof on the prosecution. 
PART II 
I share Professor Friedman’s hope that better testimony about 
the limits of forensic science testimony, accompanied by thoughtful 
instructions, will lead to better results.  If particular evidence was 
admissible when initially offered by the defense, but not when 
initially offered by the prosecution, that tilt would enhance the 
 
 3 SIXTH CIRCUIT DISTRICT JUDGES ASS., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS ch. 
1.03 (1991). 
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difficulty of assessing the probative value of the testimony and 
explaining its limits. 
If a “mercy rule” were applied to a certain type of forensic 
evidence, call it Test X, then the defense would be the master of 
whether results of the test were admitted.   Even if the prosecution 
had incriminating evidence based on the test, the defense would have 
the choice not to open the door when the defense learned of it on 
discovery.  If the prosecution had no Test X evidence or if the 
defense thought that dueling experts might increase the chance of 
acquittal, then the defense could privately go to a Test X expert and 
get her opinion.  If the results were unfavorable to the defense, the 
defense could either drop the inquiry or look for a more malleable 
expert.  The result would be that the jury would never hear anything 
about Test X unless the defense got a favorable result.  The 
asymmetric approach would create a nonblind research program in 
which the principal investigator would report only results that 
confirmed his hypothesis, and the forum would not publish results 
unfavorable to the hypothesis except in direct rebuttal of a finding by 
one of the proponents. 
There are many problems with prosecution forensic evidence, 
but in one respect it starts from a better footing than defense 
evidence.  There is often more than one suspect to be tested.  
Therefore, the researcher, even if biased toward the state, has more 
of an incentive to be objective. 
Under an asymmetric regime, there would obviously have to be 
some degree of reciprocity, so that certain proffers by the defendant 
would open the door to prosecution evidence of a similar nature.  If 
the defense offers evidence that the defendant passed Test X, then 
the prosecution ought to be allowed to offer evidence that the 
defendant failed Text X when administered by the prosecution.  
What would the boundaries of an asymmetric approach be?  If the 
defense passed a defense polygraph test and the prosecution 
witnesses passed a prosecution polygraph test, would the prosecution 
be barred from putting in this evidence?  Or would the prosecution 
be permitted to put in the same kind of dubious evidence as the 
defense, and only be barred from offering different evidence of equal 
dubiousness?  These are vexing questions that would not need to be 
answered under a symmetric approach. 
Under an asymmetric approach, exactly what types of forensic 
science evidence might be admissible on behalf of the defendant, but 
not on behalf of the prosecution?  In email correspondence with me, 
Professor Friedman indicated that one example would be polygraph 
tests. 
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Before discussing the polygraph example, I would like to note 
my agreement with Professor Friedman that there ought to be 
definitive precedent on the admissibility of forensic tests.  The 
Supreme Court is wrong if it means otherwise in its repeated 
language about trial court discretion over the admission of expert 
testimony.4  Identical forensic testimony should not be admissible in 
one courtroom but inadmissible next door.  I also agree with 
Professors Denbeaux and Risinger that the precedent should be task-
specific,5 and therefore believe that different islands of precedent 
should apply to the guilty knowledge test as opposed to the control 
question test, or to findings of deceit as opposed to findings of no 
deceit.  Suppose, then, that the judge is convinced that the control 
question polygraph test, when used to show lack of deceit, is likely to 
mislead the jury.  Perhaps the judge believes that the test has some 
value, that it somewhat increases the chance that the subject was not 
deceitful, but that the jury is likely to give the test many times its true 
value.  Suppose also that presenting testimony to tutor the jury on the 
true value of the test would be expensive and mainly futile.  Should 
polygraph evidence then be admissible if offered by the defendant, 
but not if offered by the prosecution?  It shares the problems of “Test 
X.” 
There are other reasons to be dubious about freely admitting 
polygraph tests offered by the defense.  Much of the existing research 
about the effectiveness of polygraph testing has been performed on 
subjects who are naive about countermeasures.  These studies would 
not be generalizable to actual use at trial if the polygraph became a 
routine part of the defense arsenal.  A judge can exclude this 
evidence if, as seems probable, training in countermeasures can 
defeat or seriously impair the effectiveness of the test in detecting 
deceit.6  The admission of polygraph tests could also exaggerate the 
advantage possessed by wealthy defendants.  They are in the best 
position to employ malleable but convincing polygraphers, and to 
find and benefit from expert tutoring in countermeasures.7 
 
 4 See General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), see also Kumho Tire Co., 
Ltd., v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 5 Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: How 
the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 
in Fall 2003). 
 6 See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW—FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES 589-
91 (2002); see also State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739 (1997).  For a website that teaches 
countermeasures, see http://antipolygraph.org/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2003). 
 7 Another problem is that the defendant has a right not to testify, and the 
prosecution cannot comment on the exercise of that right.  Surely the defendant 
should not be allowed to exercise that right while also putting in the expert 
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Another danger is that jurors will draw negative inferences from 
the absence of evidence.  If jurors learn that polygraph tests are 
admissible, they might draw inferences against defendants who do 
not present the evidence, or against the prosecution for not 
presenting it.  To assist in assessing probative value, will the judge 
instruct that one defendant could afford the test but the other 
couldn’t?  Will he try to explain to the jury why the nontested 
defendant didn’t go to the prosecution for the test?  What would the 
instruction be if the co-defendant who didn’t present polygraph 
evidence had gone to the police for the test, but flunked the police-
administered test? 
An asymmetrical approach toward expert testimony would also 
harm the reputation of the courts, because it is the type of rule likely 
to be understood only by lawyers.  Imagine the clinician prepared to 
testify about rape trauma syndrome.  She would look dimly on the 
legal system were she told that she could testify for a defendant in 
one courtroom in support of the defense contention that the victim 
was not raped because she displayed no signs of rape trauma, whereas 
in the next courtroom she could not testify for the prosecution in 
support of the contention that the existence of rape trauma 
symptoms increases the probability that a different victim was raped. 
I do not deny that there are some instances in which one can 
justify treating criminal cases differently than civil cases for purposes 
of evidence rules.  For example, it is justified where exclusion is 
necessary to prevent or deter abuse of governmental power, as might 
occur were the fruits of illegal confessions admissible or the 
defendant’s confrontation right abolished.  Where the purpose of the 
rule is to prevent inferential error, however, then an even-handed 
approach is the better one. 
PART III 
Professor Nance has argued, in his paper for this symposium, 
that courts should consider whether experts are repeat players when 
deciding whether to admit suppositional science because exclusion 
can have ex ante benefits by causing repeat players to do more 
research and produce better science.  Professor Imwinkelried’s 
critique of that paper questions the foundation for this requirement 
 
testimony of a polygrapher saying that he was not deceitful when he denied 
committing the crime.  That would deprive the prosecution of cross-examination and 
encourage the strategic substitution of inferior evidence.  Even the leading pro-
polygraph case of United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989) (en 
banc), would not admit the test unless the person found to be deceitful or 
nondeceitful testified. 
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in the text or history of the rules, and also queries its administrability.  
Regardless of who is right, the concept does not seem to do much to 
differentiate the prosecution expert and the defense expert in the 
area of forensic science.  The handwriting analyst, polygrapher or 
ballistics expert who testifies for the defense is just as likely to be a 
repeat player as a prosecution witness.  Indeed, the prosecution 
witnesses who hone their skills by working full time in a police lab 
might be encouraged to do more research and make their fields 
more scientific if they knew that failing to do so would not only 
diminish their usefulness to the prosecution, but would also shut off a 
second career as a defense expert. 
PART IV 
I have commented on one procedural advantage provided to the 
defendant: the reasonable doubt rule.  Another advantage is that the 
trial judge cannot direct a verdict against a criminal defendant, nor 
grant the prosecution a new trial if the defendant is acquitted.  
Arguably, judges therefore need to be vigilant in excluding defense 
evidence that might be given exaggerated importance and lead to a 
fanciful doubt.  David McCord argues that this imbalance is one 
reason why courts are stricter with defense evidence that blames 
alternative perpetrators by showing that other people had a motive to 
commit the crime than with prosecution evidence that shows 
defendant had a motive.8  The same argument could be made in 
support of the position that judges should actually be stricter with 
defense forensic science evidence than with prosecution evidence. 
Ultimately, arguments from procedural advantages provided to 
the defendant always cut both ways.  It can be argued that the 
advantage reflects a value judgment in favor of the defendant, and 
that value judgment means that courts should be liberal in admitting 
defense expert testimony.  Or it can be argued that the advantage tilts 
the field too far in favor of the defendant, and that to offset it or 
prevent its overexploitation, courts should be cautious in admitting 
dubious defense expert testimony. 
PART V 
Professor Friedman cites several evidence rules as examples of 
asymmetric admissibility rules.  I think that these rules have a quite 
different basis.  They are either not asymmetric at all or asymmetric 
 
 8 David McCord, “But Perry Mason Made it Look So Easy:” The Admissibility of 
Evidence Offered by a Criminal Defendant to Suggest That Someone Else Is Guilty, 63 TENN. 
L. REV. 917, 925-26 (1996). 
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in very weak sense. 
I will begin with a rule that, admittedly, is usually believed to be 
asymmetric.  That is the so-called “mercy rule,” the rule that allows a 
criminal defendant to call character witnesses attesting to his good 
character.  The prosecution cannot call witnesses attesting to 
defendant’s bad character until the defendant has opened the door 
in this fashion.9 
I think this rule can be fully explained by differences in 
probative value.  Defense character evidence has greater probative 
value than prosecution character evidence because the prosecution 
has potent ways to fight back when the defense offers character 
evidence.  The prosecution can not only introduce reputation and 
opinion testimony, but can also ask the character witness questions 
about any pertinent bad conduct in the defendant’s life, whether or 
not it resulted in conviction.  It can even ask about arrests that did 
not lead to charges.  Thus, a defendant is unlikely to initiate the 
inquiry unless his life can bear this sort of examination.  So when the 
defense offers the evidence, it is evidence of an unblemished life, 
whereas if the prosecution offered it, it would only be evidence of a 
particular reputation or opinion.  If given the opportunity to initiate 
the character inquiry, the prosecution could introduce character 
evidence without fear of effective specific-acts rebuttal (impeachment 
of the witnesses by asking about defendant’s good deeds does not 
have the same bite).  The defense is deterred from presenting 
character evidence except when it is most probative, whereas 
prosecution-initiated character evidence would have no such 
constraints. 
If I am wrong, and Rule 404 is truly asymmetric, then the most 
probable explanation is that defense character evidence helps the 
powerful and well-connected, and hence is more popular with 
rulemakers than other pro-defense evidence.  If so, I do not think 
that it is a model that ought to be copied. 
Rule 609(a)(2), another rule cited by Professor Friedman as 
asymmetric, is even easier to explain as a straight distinction based on 
prejudice and probative value.  This is the rule about the admissibility 
of prior convictions to impeach.  In effect, it tells judges to give more 
protection to criminal defendants than to other witnesses in 
balancing prejudice against probative value.  This rule makes sense, 
not as a break for criminal defendants, but simply because the 
evidence is less probative and more prejudicial when offered against 
 
 9 FED. R. EVID. 404(a). 
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a criminal defendant than when offered against other witnesses.  
First, against the witness who is a criminal defendant, the jury might 
use the evidence for more than its permitted purpose of 
undermining the witness’s credibility.  Second, the probative value of 
the evidence  is less because the situational pressure on a guilty 
defendant to lie is so great that his prior character for lying hardly 
tells us anything about the probability that he will lie to get out of a 
serious criminal accusation. As Professor Friedman has stated in 
another article: 
If I am right that character impeachment 
evidence of a criminal defendant is always, or almost 
always, more prejudicial than probative and that 
sometimes character evidence impeaching a 
prosecution witness may be more probative than 
prejudicial, then this asymmetry does make sense; it 
simply responds to different situations with different 
results, each promoting the truth-determining 
process.  Indeed, in some situations, an asymmetrical 
evidentiary rule may be considered corrective of an 
asymmetry inherent in the situation.  The accused is 
simply in a different situation from any other potential 
witness—for either the prosecution or the defense—in 
a criminal case.  (Note in this connection that I do not 
argue that there should be a per se rule against 
character impeachment evidence of defense 
witnesses.)10 
Professor Friedman also cites Rule 412 as an asymmetrical 
evidence rule.  Apparently Rule 412 is on the list because it prevents 
the admission of an alleged victim’s sexual history to show that she is 
promiscuous, while the defendant’s prior sexual crimes are 
admissible to show that he is a rapist.  Unlike the other examples, if it 
is asymmetric it is a pro-prosecution asymmetry.  One can certainly 
argue, however, even from the pure accuracy point of view, that the 
rule is not asymmetrical because the probative value of prior serious 
sex crimes by the defendant is greater than the probative value of 
ordinary sexual activity by the victim.11  At any rate, the rule is a rather 
weak pillar in support of the proposition that values behind the 
reasonable doubt rule require greater permissiveness for defense 
 
 10 Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: The Asymmetrical 
Interaction Between Personality and Situation, 43 DUKE L.J. 816, 830 (1994). 
 11 For a fuller development of this argument, see David P. Bryden & Roger C. 
Park, “Other Crimes” Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 568-71 (1994). 
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evidence; the more obvious and compelling thought is that if the rule 
is relevant to the issue at all, it cuts the other way. 
Rules 803(8)(B) and (C) round out Professor Friedman’s list of 
asymmetric rules.  Whether the first of these, 803(8)(B), treats the 
prosecution and defense differently in any way is not at all clear.  It 
literally provides that police records are not admissible when offered 
by either side in a criminal case.12  It is true, however, that some cases 
treat the rule’s apparent ban as a drafting error, and state that the 
records may be received when offered by the defense.13 
Even if 803(8)(B) allows the defense but not the prosecution to 
use the evidence, it is questionable whether the rule is really 
asymmetric when considered against the background of other 
evidence rules.  Under the hearsay rules considered as a whole, the 
prosecution would not be able to put in its own adversarially 
prepared records, but the defense could use the prosecution’s 
adversarially prepared records against the prosecution under the 
non-literal interpretation of FRE 803(8)(B).   Similarly, the defense 
could not put in the defendant’s adversarially prepared records, even 
though the prosecution could use those records against the 
defendant under the admissions rule.  Either side could use its own 
routine business records.  The system of rules is broadly 
symmetrical.14   
Under the explicit language of Rule 803(8)(C), the defense can 
use factual findings made by the government resulting from an 
investigation made pursuant to law, absent an indication of lack of 
trustworthiness, but the government cannot use those findings 
against the defense in a criminal case.  Again, this does not favor the 
defense as much as it seems to when considered against the 
background of other evidence rules.  Findings by the government can 
be used against the government but not for it.  Findings by the 
defense can be used against the defense but not for it.  To illustrate, 
 
 12 For years I thought this was a drafting oversight, and as a member of the 
Minnesota Advisory Committee, I made a presentation to the rule-making body, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, on behalf of the Advisory Committee’s proposed revision 
of the rule to correct this perceived error.  The revised rule would have explicitly 
provided that 804(8)(B) evidence was admissible when offered by the defense, but 
not when offered by the prosecution.  A prosecutor stood up and said that police 
reports often contained unreliable information and shouldn’t be admissible against 
the prosecution.  Apparently the Court found her argument more persuasive than 
mine, because it did not accept the proposed revision. 
 13 See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 973 (2d ed. 
1999), and cases cited therein at n.2. 
 14 Admittedly, the defense might have somewhat of an advantage because of a 
greater capacity to protect records under the attorney-client privilege. 
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suppose that a white-collar defendant offers in evidence the results of 
an internal investigation in which the defendant’s investigator made 
findings of fact with an eye toward litigation.  The defendant could 
not use that self-serving investigation,15 but the government could use 
it as the admission of an agent, and the fact that it contains opinion 
and second-hand knowledge would be no obstacle.  The symmetry is 
not perfect, however, because sometimes the defense investigation 
would find shelter under the attorney-client privilege, while it is less 
likely to do so in the case of a prosecution investigation.  On the 
other hand, in some ways the rules governing out-of-court admissions 
are asymmetric against the defendant because some courts hold that 
statements by public agents are not admissible under the exemption 
for agency admissions.16 
The most clearly asymmetric evidence rule is Rule  804(b)(3), 
the statement against interest exception.  In its present form (an 
amendment is pending but not assured), the final sentence of this 
rule provides that “[a] statement tending to expose the declarant to 
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not 
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement.”17  This rule, which is asymmetric 
against the defendant, reflects the time-honored suspicion of 
testimony offered on behalf of the defendant that unavailable third 
parties confessed to the crime.  There is a fear that a naive juror 
would find fabricated confessions to raise a reasonable doubt when 
they did not, and that the results would be irremediable because the 
prosecution could not have a new trial.  The same fear could be used 
to argue, not that defendants should be freely allowed to offer 
suppositious expert testimony, but that the trustworthiness of the 
testimony should be clear when it is offered to exculpate a criminal 
defendant. 
 
 
 15 See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 110-16 (1943); see also FED. R. EVID. 
803(6) advisory committee’s note.  But cf. Lewis v. Baker, 526 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(defendant railroad’s investigation records admissible in civil case). 
 16 See ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT GUIDE TO THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE AS APPLIED TO AMERICAN TRIALS 258-59 (1998), and cases cited therein.  
Another evidence rule cited by Professor Friedman, Rule 301, is asymmetric but is 
not a rule governing the admission or exclusion of evidence.  It simply protects the 
presumption of evidence by limiting the rule that presumptions shift the burden of 
production to civil cases. 
 17 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
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PART VI 
The issue discussed here requires resolution of the value 
question of what level of proof should be required to convict and the 
empirical question of whether a looser attitude toward defense expert 
testimony will help achieve convictions when the proof is sufficient 
and acquittals when it is not.  My own guess is that having different 
standards of proof for experts will not help achieve the goal.  The 
American system of tendentious paid experts is of dubious help even 
when the experts testify about valid areas of expertise.  When the 
field itself is weak, courts should use the same standard for defense 
and prosecution and forbid both to offer the testimony.  That is also 
the simpler solution, leading to less complex precedent, and the 
solution more intuitively appealing to criminal justice consumers. 
When a procedural change increases the number of guilty 
defendants who go free, there is a danger that new measures will 
appear to counteract that change. If the playing field tilts to the 
defendant in terms of evidence advantages at trial, that tilt might be 
balanced out by increases in punishment without trial.  Punishment 
without trial can be achieved in many ways, including tolerance of 
police brutality, increases in penalties that give the prosecution more 
leverage in inducing guilty pleas, civil commitment of persons alleged 
to be dangerous, or even by executive declaration that the country is 
at war and that enemies of society, therefore, may be held without 
trial.  We should be wary of remedies that might reduce false positives 
by increasing false negatives, while looking for reforms that will 
reduce both. 
It is possible to reduce both, or at least to decrease false positives 
without increasing false negatives.  Improving lineups, for example by 
using sequential blind lineups, could well reduce the risk of false 
positives without increasing false negatives.  Mandatory tape 
recording of police interrogations might decrease both false positives 
and false negatives.  Establishing independent crime labs, as 
advocated by Professor Giannelli,18 is a third possibility.  Those are 
the sorts of evidentiary reforms we ought to be advocating for in the 
criminal justice system. 
There are other political dangers.  Once a formal separation of 
civil and criminal cases is made, those who are interested in 
loosening the requirements for prosecution evidence have the 
chance to tinker with the criminal rules.  Keeping the two together is 
 
 18 Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for 
Independent Crime Laboratories, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439 (1997). 
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more likely to promote fairness in screening expert testimony.  Those 
who fear that the prosecution will get away with admitting junk 
science ought to be happy to ride on the coattails of the large 
manufacturers who lobby for tort reform in civil cases. 
AFTERTHOUGHT 
I see that I have fallen prey to the law professor’s temptation to 
argue, and have not noted the many points at which I found useful 
insights in Professor Friedman’s draft, or at which I agreed with him.  
I can only ask the reader to bear in mind that my misgivings are 
limited and that I admire Professor Friedman’s contribution. 
